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BOOK REVIEWS
The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente
Harry Gelman. Ithaca; Cornell University
Press 1984. 268 pgs. $9.95 pb.
A decade has now passed since the era of detente; an era in which EastW est relation s appeared to have overcome the psychological barrie rs that
mired the two oppo sing camp s in a cold war for a quarter of a centur y. In
the West, detente was perceived foremost as diminishing the haunting
specter of nuclear war. For Europeans in particular, detente was also
perceived as dimini shing the threat of another conventional war on the continent. For American s, detente was a ray of light piercing the overcast of
Vietnam . Beyond these psychological effects, detente yielded tangible
economic and cultural benefits which brought the business, labor , and intellectual communities of the West to its defense. The era of detene was a
truly heady period in East-West relations and, as with all such times, a
period when critical voices were readily dismissed.
Detente faded in the latter 1970s due largely to Western disillusionment
over the Soviet Union' s expansioni st policies during that time. Toda y,
however, as the events associated with those policies begin to recede from
our collective conscience, one senses a longing in the West for a return to
the halcyon days of trade, summit meeting s, cultural exchanges, bilateral
treaties, ·and scientific cooperation . In the recently concluded U .S. presidential campaign, for example, both candidates were generously deferential
toward the Soviet Union. In Western Europe too, interest in improvi ng relations between the superpowers is being reinvigorated. As a result, even the
smallest sign of a thaw in relations, such as Gorbachev's visit to Great
Britain last December or the Shultz -Gromyko meeting in Geneva a month
later, commands enormous media attention in the West. "Improve d relations" between East and West is today a political end in itself, not a means
as Kissinger's grand strategy once envisaged it to be.
The current groundswell of opinion favoring improved East-Wes t relations makes Harry Gelman's The Brezhnev Politburo and The Decline oj
Detente a timely publication. Gelman's book is a ,study of the rise and fall
of detente from a Soviet perspective. Other scholars, most notably Richard
Pipes, have also analyzed detente from Soviet perspective but have concentrated primarily on its geo-political and 'ideological dimensions . Gelman,
who is a Senior Staff Member at the Rand Corporation, also includes
chapters on these topics, but his study of detente is distinguishe d by its
revealing look into the Byzantine world of Soviet politics. Gelman discusses
the major power trends inside the Brezhnev Politburo and how they influenced Soviet Attitudes toward detente . He also discusses Brezhnev's
adroitness in exploiting these trends for personal gain. Though no study of
internal Soviet politics can be definitive, German's book is less speculative
than most. In this way the author achieves his goal of contrib uting to
Kremlinology in the tradition of Michael Tatu and Robert Conquest.
Gelman's main thesis is that detente had an entirely different set of
assumptions in the Soviet Union than it did in the West. Moscow's objectives in pursuing detente · had little in common with the West's desire for
reducing global conflict. On the contrary, Moscow's decision to pursue
detente was made in the context of a major military buildup and a growing
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influence of the military establishment in Soviet decisionmaking-both
of
which fueled a pre-existing impulse to expand. Detente was explicitly deJinked from military and strategic matters in the Soviet scheme of things.
As evidence, Gelman describes the political factors behind Brezhnev's
consolidation of power after the displacement of Khrushchev. In brief,
Brezhnev was able to forge an alliance with the leaders of the military, the
security forces, and the ideologues in the party Secretariet by supporting a
reversal of Khrushchev's priorities in these areas (Khrushchev had favored
the consumer and agricultural sectors of the economy over the military and
capital goods sectors, and a limited political liberalization). His hard-line
stance enabled Brezhnev to eclipse the rival faction in the Politburo led
Nikolai Podgorny, who believed that Nikita Sergeyevich had the right ideas
and was only misguided in his methods. Gelman describes several subsequent political maneuvers by Brezhnev which had the common thread of
enhancing the Politburo's pro-military faction. In 1973, for example,
Brezhnev brought the heads of the three "national security" bureaucracies
(the foreign ministry, the KGB, and the defense ministry) into the Politburo.
He also strengthened the influence of the Defense Council, a body responsible for defense matters, in the Politburo's decisionmaking .
In achieving
the reversal in priorities, Brezhnev established the
groundwork for his opening to the West. His objectives were to seek
technology and consumer goods from the West to help compensate for the
reduction in investment in these sectors, according to Gelman. Arms control, Brezhnev's carrot to the West, was not to include anything that the
military had already planned for.
The picture that emerges from Gelman's analysis of the rise of detente
is that of a powerful pro-military influence in the Brezhnev Politburo's
decision-making process. Domestic development and detente were subordinate to military and military-related prerogatives. In this regard, Gelman
analogizes detente to an island in a stream of continuous Soviet efforts from
the 1960s to the 1980s to displace the U .S. in the world. "Like an island,
detente neither halted nor changed the surrounding process ." Kissinger's
grand strategy to entangle the Soviets in a web of interrelationships that
would temper their aggressive impulses, it turns out, overestimated
Moscow's pliability.
In his discussion of the decline of detente, Gelman again points to the
militarist and ideological forces operating inside the Politburo. By 1975, the
Soviet Union's growing "predisposition to act" combined with American
impotence and several fortuitous international conflicts to produce a marked
increase in Soviet adventurism. Only then did it become evident to the main
body of Western opinion that the spirit of detente had a different face in
Moscow than in the We t.
As for the Soviets, Gelman's description of their attitude toward the
decline of detente provides an instructive insight into their thinking. The
Soviets, Gelman states, interpreted their expansionist behavior not as a
betrayal of detente, but as an entirely appropriate response consistent with
the changing global correllation of forces. The Soviets believed further that
it was the American public reaction to their behavior that was inappropriate; "a reflection of the unfortunate influence of misguided or intransigent
forces in the American elite who were unable to accept with grace the
historic inevitability of either the U.S. defeats of the 1970s or the Soviet ad75

vances." When combined with a militarist / expansionist dispositi on , such
moral relativism creates an ominous presence; one that many of the West
seem prepared to again disregard in the pursuit of "improved relations."
Gelman states that by the early 1980s Brezhnev was on the political
defensive because attention to defense matters began to "leve l-off"
Gelman offers no explanation here, but one can speculate that this ma;
have been a manifestation of the general sloth that characterize d Soviet
bureaucracy in Brezhnev's later years. Whatever the cause, the Po litburo's
pro-military faction sought to exert its influence in the succession struggle
following Brezhnev's death. They were apparently successful as Brezhnev' s
chosen succesor, Konstantin Chernenko, was bypassed in favor of Yuri
Andropov, who enjoyed the support of then Defense Minister Ustinov
according to Gelman. Andropov, like Brezhnev before him, rode the cres~
of the prevailing political trend in the Politburo to the apex of Soviet power.
Though Gelman's book ends with the advent of Andropov, his research
leads one to conclude that Chernenko must have subsequently relieved the
pro-military faction of its earlier doubts about him.
Insights such as these, although oblique by comparison to more open
societies, make The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente an important contribution to our understanding of Soviet thinking and behavior,
especially in the present period of renewed pressure for accomm odation
with the Soviet Union. Gelman's book underscores the point that sober appraisals of what is realistically achievable with the current generation of
Soviet leaders are needed if the opinion favoring "improved relatio ns" with
the Soviet Union is to be put in its proper perspective. For tho ugh Brezhnev,
Suslov, Andropov, and Ustinov have passed on, the pattern of militarism
and ideological discipline in the Soviet Union endures. It is therefore
unreasonable to expect that the basic foreign policy corollaries of this pattern will change. On the contrary, as Gelman argues, "it is plausi ble to suppose that the leadership now hopes, through the slow return of the pendulum of American opinion, eventually to obtain a bilateral improve ment
without any modification in behavior in the world at large."
Gelman does not offer any hope for a way out of this plight. Some
reassuring note in this regard would have been welcomed, even if only the
obvious changeover in generations of Soviet leadership. But this is an
aesthetic point that does not detract from the book's effectiveness. Overall,
the book is rich in detail and its points are well argued. The book is written
in a very readable style and has a very humane length. Its appeal lies in its
presenting a realist's view of the Soviet Union without the emotio nal anticommunism or clarion call to arms which, however justifiable, are offending to many readers. Gelman's is a critical voice that in the present political
climate needs to be heard .
Richard Bro wn
Empire Stat e College
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Problems in Administrative Reform, Edited by Robert Miewald and
Michael Steinman. Chicago: Nelson Hall Press. 1984. p. 265.
On the surface, Problems in Administrative Reform is not an appealing
proposition. It is composed of fifteen essays on widely divergent topics in
public administration presented at a conference held more than six years
ago. Moreover, the price of the volume is nearly $30. A careful examination
reveals a few noteworthy highlights amidst a host of unanswered and unaddressed questions.
The scope of the book is wide indeed. Meiwald and Steinman assemble
works that conceptualize administrative reform variously as an input, a
process, and an output. They examine reform at all levels of government;
four of the studies focus on the national level, eight on the state and local
level and three look at reform in general. The topics addressed range from
zero based budgeting to court reform and from technological change to the
reorganization of H.E. W. The essays are primarily case studies, with a
sprinkling of quantitative analysis.
Of the studies covering federal reform, the essay by Carl Grafton stands
out. He presents a sophisticated model to explain the creation and
reorganization of federal agencies. Drawing data from 85 agencies created
de novo at the federal level and a sample of 48 federal reorganizations,
Grafton argues that it is unprecedented, large-scale discontinuity which
forces governments to reconceptualize their role that is the driving force
behind most agency creation and reorganization.
By far the most interesting of the studies of state reform is that by Kenneth
Kraemer and William Dutton. In their essay "The Interests Served by
Technological Reform: The Case of Computing", they ask "how the functions of technological reform may be political as well as technical" (p. 102).
After a rigorous analysis of data from forty-two U.S. cities, the authors
conclude that technological reform tends to support the status quo against
the forces of change and the interests of professional managers over elected
officials.
In the end, this is not a coherent package. The various essays seem to have
nothing to connect them beyond their broad association with administration. The reader is left to conclude that sometimes reform makes a difference, sometimes it does not, and often it is difficult to tell. No attempt is
made to synthesize these works or distill some overall conclusions. Indeed,
the editors do not even provide a concluding essay. The result is that while
each study makes an individual contribution to our understanding of administrative reform, when looked at together they tell us very little.
Michael Mumper
Winthrop College
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The Third Reich, 1933-1939: A Historical Bibliography. Santa Barbara
Cal.: ABC-Clio, 1984. 239 pages. Volume 10, ABC-Clio Research Guides:

This volume, the tenth in the series of ABC-Clio research guides, is invaluable to political scientists and historians studying Nazi Germany.
Because of the catastrophe of World War II and the Holocaust, and
because of the capture of masses of Nazi records at the end of the war
scholars have examined every aspect of the Nazi regime. They have produced
hundreds of books and articles. This book, which covers the years
preceding World War II, during which Adolf Hitler consolidated his power
and prepared his country for war, contains 932 abstracts of journal articles.
The latter appear mainly in American, British, European, and Soviet journals.
The abstracts are separated into seven chapters. The first chapter,
"Nazi Germany in Historical Context,'' covers a wide range of topics, including historiographical and interpretive essays on Hitler and his regime.
Chapter two, " Dome stic Policies and Politics," examines government activities and the establishment and growth of the German armaments industry and military forces. Chapter three, "Nazi Foreign Policy,'' includes
abstracts of articles on Nazi diplomacy and alliances, and especially on
German relations to Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The response of
other nations to Nazi aggression in the 1930s is also covered. The fourth
chapter, "German Culture and Society,'' contains writings about Nazi art,
the popular media, literature, theater, and the life of the average German
citizen. Chapter five, "The Crushing of German Jewry," presents extensive
documentation on Nazi anti-Semitism and the early stages of German
persecution of the Jews. The final chapters are titled "Christianity in
Crisis" and "The Left under Siege."
The editors of this fine volume have taken much care to provide useful
abstracts. Most are a paragraph in length, they furnish the necessary
bibliographical data, discuss the subject and thesis of the article, and even
mention the sources on which the article is based. The work also has excellent subject and author indexes. My principal criticism of the book is that
it covers only journal literature published between 1973 and 1982. The work
is sufficiently moderate in length (239 pages) that it could have been expanded to include articles that appeared since the .mid-1960s, when the bulk
of captured Nazi documents became available to scholars and the explosion
of scholarship on Nazi Germany started. The inclusion of such material
would have made a fine reference and bibliographic work even better.
Donald M. McKale
Clemson University
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